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Introduction
Since the accession to power of Kim Jong-un, the North Korean state has lost
no time in establishing the appearance of an accelerated internationalization.1 One
important element in this process has been what is, by North Korea’s own closed stan-
dards, a rather vigorous program of cultural diplomacy. The performing arts have
been at the forefront of these exchanges and activities. In 2012, a North Korean sym-
phony orchestra traveled to France, and North Korea’s huge “Sea of Blood” opera
company toured all over China. Meanwhile, at home, a new brand of North Korean
regime-pop, christened the Moranbong Band, was even used to tantalize Western
commentators with visions of a North Korean “opening up.” Photography exhibi-
tions went forward with the U.S., musical exchanges continued with Norway and Ger-
many, and joint ﬁlm projects with China also emerged as important elements in
cultural diplomacy. These elements are part of a developing North Korean “soft
power” strategy which complements and assists the country’s diplomatic and strate-
gic goals.
When discussing North Korean soft power, however, context matters more than
ever before. Spring 2012, the time frame under consideration in this article, was a
period of extreme activity by the DPRK on the world stage, culminating in a much-
anticipated and -protested missile test on April 13, 2012. Given that the DPRK’s cul-
tural diplomacy in that period coincided also with domestic propaganda that was
intensely xenophobic even by North Korean standards, it is possible and probably
likely that the reasons behind the move to engage in cultural diplomacy in early 2012
were purely tactical. These soft-power efforts thus bear upon North Korean politics
of aid as well as nuclear weapons. This is not to say that the efforts were fruitless or
not engaged in willingly with the American and French partners who we discuss in
this article. In both cases, the DPRK enlisted the collaboration of legitimate part-
ners (the Associated Press and France Radio Orchestra) and an actual audience for
their art, music, and a political message thereby. The support of legitimate partner
institutions aids in illustrating that cultural diplomacy has served an important and
limited success for the Kim Jong-un regime, if only meant to show domestically as
a sign of the DPRK’s growing internationalism. Finally, looking into the interactions
more deeply allows for greater insight into the questions of whether Kim Jong-un’s
rule represents, portends, or only feigns a bona ﬁde internationalization of the DPRK.
IR Theory, Cultural Diplomacy 
and North Korea’s History
Power, a somewhat nebulous concept deﬁned succinctly as the ability to affect
others, lies at the center of international relations (IR) theory. This concept has tra-
ditionally been explained in a bifurcated way, describing how one state affects another
state’s behavior through some combination of coercion and inducement, an under-
standing of power best represented by the “carrot and stick” idiom and recorded in
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the IR dictionary as “hard power.” Though realists, neoliberalists, and constructivists
are not ineluctably bound to use conventional IR theory analysis, even a cursory
reading of the available literature—old and new—reveals the dominance of hard
power analysis. Since the end of the Cold War era, however, the introduction of “soft
power” opened up an alternative conceptualization of power.2 Soft power empha-
sizes a state’s use of “attraction” to get others to want the same thing they want with-
out resorting to the use of coercion or inducement.3 In other words, soft power
augments the state’s ability to peacefully project and aggrandize its overall power in
the international system. Most importantly, the way a state “attracts” other states is
not by threat of military force or ﬁnancial sanctions, but through the use of cultural
resources: cinema, sports, art, literature, rock bands, radio broadcasts, symphony
orchestras, and other forms of culture. The use of such resources as a form of soft
power is known as cultural diplomacy. We are unaware of speciﬁc literature on soft
power in materials studied within the halls and foreign outposts of the North Korean
Foreign Ministry, but it would be virtually impossible for them to be unaware of the
concept. After all, Chinese foreign affairs journals—which tend to be relatively the
easiest to access for North Koreans—have been promoting the concept widely in the
past three years, and in 2012 the concept even became a major leg in Hu Jintao’s ﬁnal
report to the Party Congress. Notably, Chinese efforts to harness soft power could
be particularly attractive to North Korean counterparts because the Chinese under-
standing of the concept emphasizes that an understanding of soft power is necessary
so that one can defend one’s own country from the soft power depredations and plots
of the capitalist states, particularly the U.S.
North Korean Cultural Diplomacy: A Historical Perspective
Despite its popular portrayal as a “rogue state” whose modus operandi revolves
around the reckless use of brinkmanship—nuclear and otherwise—as a means to
dupe the outsider world into conceding aid to prop up the ruling elite, North Korea,
too, has a historical foundation for the use of soft power through its use of cultural
diplomacy.
In the “liberation” period from 1945 to 1948, North Koreans were engaged in
forms of cultural diplomacy even before their state was established.4 Due to strong
Soviet support and an ambivalent American occupation government to the south,
Pyongyang was able to lure artists and other “leftist” intellectuals and artists resid-
ing in the south across the 38th parallel and into the Soviet-occupied zone. Follow-
ing the signing of an agreement on cultural exchange in 1949, USSR-DPRK cultural
interaction increased signiﬁcantly. In addition to the North’s adoption of Russian as
its second ofﬁcial language, Charles Armstrong ﬁnds, “North Korean dance troupes,
literature, and arts were brought to the Soviet Union.” Through channels such as the
Korean-Soviet friendship society, many North Korean writers found a publication
outlet through which to propagate their political ideas.5 In the meantime, the North
Koreans had an attentive audience among the Chinese communists’ material in north-
east China (and ultimately Beijing). Many of those in this audience legitimately saw
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North Korean culture as worthy of emulation. North Korea has hardly been in a state
of perpetual tutelage, particularly when it comes to its relationship with Chinese cul-
ture.
North Korea’s strategy for cultural diplomacy grew in earnest during the Korean
War, combining fulsome Stalinist paeans along with the more pressing need for dona-
tions for the home front. Archives in East Germany and China are full of examples
of North Korean musical troupes on tour during the Korean War, wishing to extend
their stays away from the bombed-out cities of the DPRK, eating well, and collect-
ing as much material as possible to convey back home. In 1952, several large delega-
tions of North Korean performers set out for a European tour with the goal of raising
funds for the Korean War effort. German audiences were appreciative, lavishing
funds—and even books and electronic drill presses—on the DPRK state chorus, chil-
dren’s choirs, select wounded veterans and Korean People’s Army (KPA) General
Kim Il. The East German bureaucrats who were organizing the multiple perform-
ances noted that choirs made up of North Korean orphans were particularly effec-
tive in eliciting donations from audiences.6
While these interactions unmistakably took place under the mantle of Stalin-
ism, they should not be dismissed out of hand as a purely coercive Stalinist construct.
Even in the 1950s, the North Koreans were gaining understanding and experience in
conducting international tours and projecting a national identity into the interna-
tional sphere. This almost-comprehensive interaction, however, was cut short by the
purges and cultural retrenchment of the period 1956–1958. Much in the same man-
ner that Zhdanov’s decrees of 1948 had warned Soviet cultural producers that their
internationalism and contacts cultivated with well-meaning foreigners during World
War II had actually only brought danger to the body politic, North Korean intellec-
tuals and cultural workers were encouraged after 1956 to see the Soviet thaw as more
than a bit dangerous.7 While interactions were curtailed with the purges of 1956,
North Korea’s limited internationalization and external cultural diplomacy during
the prior decade should not be forgotten.
In the late 1960s, the intensiﬁcation of the Kim personality cult and tensions on
the peninsula meant that cultural diplomacy largely took the form of setting up Juche
study groups in developing and recently decolonized states, and inviting foreign rad-
icals to Pyongyang. After regional tensions peaked around 1968, the DPRK sent
dancers to Paris during the détente of the early 1970s and, moving forward, a series
of the April 15 Arts Festivals and then the 1989 Youth Games. However, interaction
with the outside world was still very much governed by totalitarian sensibilities that
refused to allow in rock music (the medium very much implicated in the East Ger-
man collapse) or democratic inﬂuences from around the region, not least of which
was the student movement in Beijing in spring 1989, an event which indicated clearly
the volatility of cultural connections.
In more recent times, the visit of the New York Philharmonic to North Korea
from February 25 through February 27, 2008, was considered by some to be a ground-
breaking, if far from pivotal, episode in the rocky history of U.S.-DPRK relations
and North Korea’s efforts to engage the Western world through cultural diplomacy
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more broadly. The visit was largely hailed in the world press as a signiﬁcant event.
As one overoptimistic Chinese analyst put it, North Korea’s willingness to accept the
U.S. guests was considered “a turning point that would improve the two countries’
bilateral relationship,” possibly leading towards an ofﬁcial visit from former U.S.
president George H.W. Bush.8 North Korea received positive coverage in the world
media, not least of which included the New York Times, and then proceeded in the
following year to ratchet down on relations with Washington and rattle the new
Obama administration (as well as the DPRK’s regional allies) with successive mis-
sile and nuclear tests.9
While the political and diplomatic backdrop upon which the visit took place soon
collapsed along with the Six-Party Talks, North Korea’s efforts to engage the world
through cultural means has not. Kim Jong-il’s heavy emphasis on military-ﬁrst pol-
itics during most of his reign largely proscribed any serious efforts at further inter-
national engagement through cultural diplomacy with nonsocialist states, but the
ﬁrst eight months of Kim Jong-un’s rule suggested that he and the ruling elite were
taking a different approach towards the handling of North Korea’s external relations
simultaneous to bolstering its military deterrent. North Korean media, after all, was
careful to depict Kim Jong-un’s active management of the national artistic and musi-
cal patrimony in the same period, as well as the military. Through examining North
Korean dealings with a key American news agency, the Associated Press, along with
a French orchestra in Paris, it becomes clear that cultural relations played, not just
a prominent role in the early months of Kim Jong-un’s rule, but an important role
that complemented the DPRK’s more traditional efforts to project an intimidating
militant façade.
KCNA-AP Joint Photo Exhibition
If there is one country on earth that takes the politics of imagery seriously, it is
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Desecration of a ﬂag or a portrait of one
of the Kims is considered nearly unforgivable, and the national media will lash out
with vituperation at outside forces that do not handle “the dignity of the DPRK”
earnestly in the visual realm. A North Korean offer to engage in a joint exhibition
of images, then, is not to be entered into lightly. The Korean Central News Agency
(KCNA) and the Associated Press (AP) held a joint photo exhibition in a small gallery
in New York City for one month in the spring: March 15, 2012–April 13, 2012. Ofﬁ-
cially entitled “Window on North Korea,” the exhibition comprised a total of 79
photographs, a compilation of KCNA stock photos, the work of AP photographers—
including AP Chief Asia Photographer David Guttenfelder—and new KCNA pho-
tos of life in North Korea.10 The event was held as part of the agreement to open an
AP bureau in Pyongyang, making it the ﬁrst Western news agency to establish a
bureau in the North Korean capital city and representing the culmination of the AP’s
effort to upgrade its stafﬁng presence from remote to full-time in the capital city.11
The negotiations which led to the agreement appear to have followed a typical path
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of protracted Western overtures, which, once the North Koreans found it satisfacto-
rily useful, moved forward, resulting in the signing of two Memoranda of Under-
standing (MOU) with KCNA in the ﬁrst half of 2011, the second of which included
the agreement to host a joint photo exhibition.12
The North Korean agreement to allow the AP a bureau in the country’s capital
can be read in several ways: ﬁrst, as the DPRK government engaged the U.S. for the
purpose of obtaining food aid, the agreement with the AP could be read as a type of
preliminary concession by North Korea and the establishment of more of a “direct
channel” to Washington. The fact that the DPRK did not engage in such negotiations
with comparable news agencies in countries where it already had diplomatic rela-
tions—for example, Britain’s BBC or Germany’s Deutsche Welle—indicates that the
U.S. connection gained through the relationship with AP was signiﬁcant. Secondly,
in exchange for opening a Pyongyang bureau, the AP, as part of its memorandum,
agreed to host the joint photo exhibition in New York City. Such an exhibition could
be interpreted as a tangible prize for a North Korean foreign affairs and propaganda
bureaucracy desirous of a boost to the celebrations marking the 100th anniversary
of the country’s founder. While North Korean propaganda frequently describes wor-
shipful treatment of Kim Il-song and his nation in foreign lands such as Nigeria,
Nepal, and Peru, an exhibition in the heart of Manhattan with one of America’s top
news organizations could be conceived of on a higher sphere of signiﬁcance. Finally,
by concluding the deal with the Associated Press, the North Korean government,
through KCNA, was able to borrow the prestige of the AP in its strategy to legitimize
its efforts abroad and accelerate at least the appearance of the internationalization of
the DPRK.13
Despite Kim Jong-il’s death in December 2011 and the announcement of a pend-
ing missile launch that would scuttle the February 29, 2012, “Leap Day” agreement
with the United States, the joint photo exhibition went on.
The event’s opening ceremony on March 15 included representatives from both
the KCNA and the AP, in addition to the gallery’s cofounder, Donald Rubin, U.S.
citizens, and members of the DPRK mission to the UN in New York. First Vice-
Director General Kim Chang-gwang led the KCNA delegation and Senior Vice Pres-
ident Kathleen Carroll and Vice President John Daniszewski represented the AP.
State Department ofﬁcials were presumably instructed to steer clear of the event, but
all parties involved clearly considered the exhibition a positive step forward in North
Korea’s relationship with the United States.14
The ofﬁcial AP press release emphasized the “uniqueness” of the images offered
as a way of getting a “rare glimpse into a nation long shrouded from view,” the entire
exhibition “designed to show what life is like in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (North Korea).”15 In her opening remarks at the exhibition, AP’s Senior Vice
President Carroll emphasized that the photographs and works of art on display “show
[the] U.S. that different people can ﬁnd common ground.” AP Chief Asia Photog-
rapher David Guttenfelder cited photographs as having the “power to break down
barriers” and emphasized how ordinary people could connect with North Korean cit-
izens by relating to their lives as they are shown in the photos.16 KCNA’s ﬁlm of Don-
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ald Rubin’s congratulatory speech may prove telling, particularly his “hope that the
exhibition would be the ﬁrst step towards cultural and political reconciliation.” Also
noteworthy is Kim Chang-gwang’s expectation that the exhibition, as a North Korean
cultural export, would promote “mutual understanding between the peoples of the
DPRK and the U.S. and improving the bilateral relations.”17
North Korean coverage of the event was somewhat less sanguine toward U.S.-
DPRK rapprochement. To emphasize ostensible “genuineness” of the event, the
KCNA incorrectly, but certainly intentionally, identiﬁed the “theme” of the exhibi-
tion as the “True Picture of Korea,” rather than using the ofﬁcial title of the exhibi-
tion. The KCNA claimed the photos depict the “undying revolutionary exploits” of
the Kim paternal dynasty towards the “building of a thriving nation, people’s hap-
piness, independent and peaceful reuniﬁcation of Korea and global independence.”18
Despite the AP’s stated intentions, as revealed in the title of the event, the notion
that the photos on display offered an accurate reﬂection of daily life inside North
Korea is a sellable line only to those woefully ignorant of actual conditions inside
North Korea. With the exception of a few slightly revealing photographs by Mr. Gut-
tenfelder—one of a lone policewoman directing ghostly trafﬁc and the other a high-
rise building shot of urban landscape in Pyongyang that seems more like a sketch of
a complex prison system —all the photographs on display provided views of the DPRK
entirely in accord with the regime’s own highly reiﬁed view of itself.19 The contrast
between the carefully staged show in New York and what was going on domestically
at precisely the same time—a huge wave of anti–Lee Myung Bak domestic propa-
ganda that included burning of Lee Myung Bak in efﬁgy and explicit threats to attack
the Blue House—could not have been more clear. The missile test announcement
only compounded the contradictions. The timing of the event with the AP seemed
to assure that North Korea was on the Western stage at precisely the right time.
Despite the contradictions, merely writing off the event as a North Korean prop-
aganda coup and a shameless agreement by the AP to a quid pro quo with an even
more shameless DPRK bureaucracy shuts the door to entertaining a broader, more
signiﬁcant point: the use of the AP, the New York episode in particular, was and
remains an integral part of North Korea’s efforts to internationalize and engage the
world — particularly the United States— through the use of cultural diplomacy.
Should the exhibition, then, be read as an effort by the KCNA to promote relations
with the U.S. government or the American people directly, via the AP? Though the
AP, like its British counterpart Reuters, or Korean equivalent Yonhap, has a distinc-
tive international presence, it is associated with the country it is incorporated in. The
fact that, by North Korean standards, print media is merely an extension—or mouth-
piece — of the central government most likely affects the way it understands and
approaches its relationship with the AP. That the two AP employees posted to the
Pyongyang ofﬁce are Americans adds to the distinctive American qualities of the AP
and certainly inﬂuences the way the DPRK government approaches its interactions
with the New York City–based news agency.
Whether the North Koreans actually believe the AP is feeding the U.S. govern-
ment information, or that American reporters in Pyongyang are receiving instruc-
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tions from Washington, though highly unlikely, is open to speculation and must, at
least, be considered when trying to understanding DPRK motivations. Unlikely
 scenarios aside, the notion that the North Korean government is attempting to use
alternative channels of communication to foster better relations is worthy of con-
templation and pulls from the past the case of Edgar Snow’s interview with Chinese
Premier Mao Zedong, during which Mao revealed to Snow in somewhat cryptic lan-
guage, not at all unusual for Mao, that he sought rapprochement with the U.S.
Will this endeavor bear fruit and prove to be a genuine “trust-building exer-
cise” leading towards a U.S.-DPRK détente, as AP Vice President and Director of Pho-
tography Santiago Lyon believes? North Korea has been granted the upper hand in
the realm of photo-diplomacy. How DPRK will use its newfound leverage is not yet
manifest.
The Unhasu Orchestra in Paris
Unfolding roughly concurrent to the exhibition in New York, a North Korean
orchestra traveled to France in March 2012 for a joint concert with a government-
funded orchestra in Paris. As with the AP exhibition, which was presumably about
people-to-people ties, a great deal of the messaging back to North Korea about the
trip was about the greatness of the Kim family. The vehicle for this visit, the Unhasu
Orchestra, had already been clearly identiﬁed in domestic propaganda with the benev-
olence and speciﬁc patronage of the ruling Kim family. Kim Jong-il’s personal asso-
ciation with the orchestra was particularly intense: there were few greater signs of
political approbation in the DPRK than to be invited to appear with the Dear Leader
at one of the orchestra’s regular performances, and, after Kim Jong-il’s death, by the
ﬁlial audiophile Kim Jong-un. Only with the rise of the Moranbong Band in July 2012
was Unhasu Orchestra’s political primacy as a North Korean musical ensemble chal-
lenged and surpassed. While the KCNA exhibition in New York sang the praises of
the suryang system, the Unhasu concert was a more striking (if subtle) manifesta-
tion of that system.
Like the AP exhibition, the Unhasu trip was perfectly timed to coincide with
North Korea’s drive to appear globally inﬂuential leading up to the 100th anniver-
sary of Kim Il-song’s birth, and for its missile tests to appear globally signiﬁcant. It
also played a speciﬁc role in diverting French and European narratives of human
rights abuses in the DPRK as well as supporting North Korea’s diplomatic drive to
receive food aid from the European Union (EU) in the aftermath of the “Leap Day”
deal falling apart with the United States. Apart from the missile test/satellite launch
itself, the orchestra’s visit to Paris was one of the primary active, action-oriented ele-
ments in North Korea’s external propaganda in March 2012. The dispatching of the
Unhasu Orchestra to Paris followed three distinct narratives in North Korean for-
eign relations.
First, it was intended as a preliminary move in an ongoing cultural diplomacy
chess match with South Korea, holding out the prospect of a similar activity in Seoul.
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Not coincidentally, the conductor of the French National Radio Symphony is Chung
Kyong-hwa, a famous South Korean who has been outspoken about the need for a
joint Korean orchestra concert in Seoul or elsewhere. Using his orchestra as formal
agency and partner which invited the Unhasu to Paris, Chung was moving ahead with
his dream in a third country rather than on the Korean Peninsula. Chung had trav-
eled to Pyongyang the year prior with the conductor of the Seoul Metropolitan
Orchestra to set up preliminary cooperation for a joint Korean concert. When polit-
ical conditions dictated that no inter–Korean orchestra arrangement could occur, he
pushed forward via the French route and found the government in Paris to be rather
receptive to the idea.
Second, the Unhasu Orchestra’s concert in Paris was intended to serve as a rea-
sonable counternarrative to the rising chorus of discontent in world media over the
DPRK’s announcement of the missile test for a satellite launch slated for April 13.
The concert was timed precisely to coincide with the aftermath of that announce-
ment, resulting in maximum publicity. Although there were a few pieces of North
Korean propaganda that afterwards compared the orchestra to an atomic bomb (and
the missile itself was named Unha-3), for the most part this was the line that was fol-
lowed.
The third primary aim of the concert was to reward the French state and fur-
ther warm it up for the ongoing drive toward normalization with Pyongyang. Kim
Jong-un was in need of some immediate diplomatic triumphs, and this could be seen
as one. The participation of French ofﬁcials (François Mitterand and Jack Lang) in
the Unhasu visit accordingly emphasized the state-to-state aspects of the visit in
North Korean domestic news. Concurrent to this push with France, a side beneﬁt
could be garnered by having the DPRK appear to be more reasonable from the EU
perspective at a sensitive time for food aid and as a riposte to accusations of North
Korean human rights violations, which have a tendency to spring across the conti-
nent. The improvement of the DPRK image in Europe is far from the nation’s top
foreign policy priority, but it is one speciﬁc area where Kim Jong-un could garner
further relatively easy prestige by improving relations and thus banking on his edu-
cation.
It should be no surprise, then, that Kim Jong-un and other high-level leaders
were far more visible in the case of the Unhasu Orchestra than they were in the case
of the AP-KCNA deal. Kim Jong-un attended an Unhasu concert just days before the
ensemble departed—the March 8 Women’s Day concert, at which they played, not
the Paris repertoire, but a very traditionally North Korean program. Among the vis-
ible individuals when it came to the Unhasu trip was Kim Ki-nam, the head of regime
propaganda, who was there to greet the Unhasu before their trip to Paris.
From the North Korean perspective, the Unhasu Orchestra was deeply entwined
with the celebration and earliest postmortem re-formation of Kim Jong-il’s legacy.
As the vehicle for a cantata, the orchestra expanded greatly and went on a punish-
ing performance schedule in January, not simply in Pyongyang, but also the east coast
city of Hamhung and the remote city of Huichon, site of a signature dam meant to
remind urban dwellers of Kim Jong-il’s commitment to solving problems of electricity
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and living standards in the DPRK. While the orchestra’s main repertoire in Paris was
that of Western romantic composers Johannes Brahms and Camille Saint-Saëns, a
normal consumer of North Korean state media would take away the obvious mes-
sage of Unhasu’s tour to Paris: imbued with the spirit of Kim Jong-il, the orchestra
was ﬂying to spread the news of the Kimist renaissance to Europe.
If it represented Kim Jong-il’s undying benevolence to the folks back home, the
orchestra’s appearance in Europe was also intended to send the important message
to potential donors to North Korea that the country is receptive to contact with the
outside. The musicians did their job here, appearing at the Louvre, where they posed
with the Mona Lisa, and spending a day at Versailles. Chinese news agency Xinhua,
among the most eager boosters of the notion of North Korea opening up, quoted a
French violinist who said, “With this collaboration, opening itself to the world—
they will soon be at the level of their neighbors.”
Inadequate harvests and concerns about international condemnation certainly
did not in and of themselves create the Unhasu Orchestra’s trip to Paris, but the
events are not unconnected. Indeed, the Unhasu’s concert was useful in giving Euro-
peans the idea that the DPRK was on the verge of opening up to the outside, and that
aid, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, would be used not for military pur-
poses.
Yet even as the halcyon images ﬂowed out of Paris, and visions developed of
future performances of Beethoven’s Ninth, and Pyongyang violinists wowed audi-
ences with their command of Stradivari, news coming out of Pyongyang was send-
ing precisely the opposite message. One of the lead items on the North Korean news
on March 14 were drills by the “Red Guard Worker-Peasant Militia” doing target
practice on Lee Myung Bak’s name. University students, presumably the core of the
new digital-cosmopolitan elite that would emerge to grasp the hand of the world,
were volunteering for military service and vowing to become one of “ﬁve million
human bombs to defend the sacred dignity of the DPRK’s leaders.” These kind of
wildly bellicose statements underscore the duality of North Korea’s strange “ham-
mer and hanbok” public relations strategy. As in the case of the missile launch on
the day the AP-KCNA photography exhibit ended, the North Koreans appear to have
completely squandered the good feelings engendered by the external activities.
Axioms of North Korean Cultural Diplomacy
Based upon our analysis of the two case studies, the following can be inferred
as representing basic components of any exchange. North Korean cultural diplo-
macy:
1. Kindles hope for reform (at least among the hopeful) and implies that engage-
ment with the DPRK is both likely and possible.
For the DPRK, engaging in cultural diplomacy strengthens the external
notion that there exists within the North Korean power-elite a cohort of soft-
liners—rarely identiﬁed by name—willing to entertain overtures for nego-
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tiation from outside parties, particularly the United States. When put more
realistically, the argument goes that such interactions help to normalize con-
tact with the West among midlevel DPRK ofﬁcials and elites who presum-
ably will someday drive policy. What this approach completely misses is that
highly orthodox men like Kim Ki-nam appear to be in charge of such efforts
and that (here and now in the present, not an ideal future) the efforts them-
selves are participated in as part of regime propaganda, wholly. This is not a
case of soft-liners sending out delegations while persuading colleagues at
home that cultural embassies are a worthwhile activity for their own sake or
that more cultural diplomacy is the vehicle through which the DPRK can be
internally transformed.
2. Represents a fraught opportunity for targeted national governments. There
is a 100 percent chance of cultural diplomacy being used by North Korea for
“propaganda purposes” and an opportunity to showcase and bolster the
North’s “unique” social and political systems as good. A primary goal here is
to increase the prestige of the cult of the leader.
3. Involves North Korean institutions and individuals who are presumably loyal
enough to the system as to avoid the risks of defection or public embarrass-
ment.20
4. Has peripheral beneﬁts for North Korean participants, which may include the
obtaining of foreign exchange and certainly is a more informal means of sup-
plying core classes in Pyongyang with luxury goods from abroad.
5. Plays a key part of what could be cynically characterized as the North’s cycle
of “provoke, entice, obtain, betray (give nothing).” Cultural diplomacy, as a
form of soft power, serves the role of enticing its intended recipient before
obtaining and betraying.
6. Has unknown effects in the DPRK. Due to the near complete lack of reliable
information coming out of North Korea, it is very difﬁcult to know how,
exactly, North Korean citizens themselves view cultural-diplomatic feats or
if these activities result in more friendly feelings toward outsiders.
7. Results in varying degrees of ongoing cooperation, more often one-sided
outcomes of unrequited cooperation; although the KCNA-AP case may be
unique if the AP’s presence in Pyongyang, despite limits to freedom of move-
ment, is read as ongoing cooperation on behalf of the DPRK.
In the Unhasu case, it seems that skeptics may, more or less, be correct in iden-
tifying that this is a one-way street. Though North Korea may be cooperating to send
its orchestra, there is nothing that happened during the event that suggests an ongo-
ing two-way cooperation with France, unless, that is, the event is interpreted more
broadly as EU orchestral diplomacy with North Korea, which has continued with the
visit of the Munich Chamber Orchestra to Pyongyang. The KCNA-AP case, how-
ever, is different from the Unhasu case and all others that have preceded it. There is
here a case of speciﬁc and ongoing two-way cooperation, even if that cooperation is
somewhat lopsided in that it favors North Korean national interests so heavily.
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As to what might be termed a socialization process borne out of the new KCNA-
AP relationship, Pyongyang Bureau Chief Jean Lee sees that the KCNA reporters
working with her and other AP personnel for training purposes, are not only non-
resistant to the process but are seemingly be transformed by it. Lee states:
There is no resistance. They are keen to learn how Western journalism works, and
they see it as an opportunity to practice their English. I’ve also seen them adopt
Western reporting techniques over the last year. They take what they need and
they try and learn from it. It’s really important to build these relationships. North
Korea is a closed country and they are suspicious of outsiders, so it takes time.
There is quite a lot of training involved!21
The AP’s belief in building trust through cooperation appears thus as part of a
larger and positive process of globalization and internalization in the DPRK. Is it so
far-fetched to wonder if such cooperation could, if nurtured, serve as a stepping-
stone in a much broader effort to improve U.S.-DPRK relations? Similarly, the notion
that a North Korean orchestra in Paris might both serve Pyongyang’s propaganda
goals and improve long-term relations with France obviously needs to be entertained.
Western liberal democracies are strong enough to handle DPRK propaganda for what
it is. While North Korea’s state news agency may sometimes bend facts to a grotesque
degree, there is no risk of “ideological contamination” in the West as a result of inter-
actions with North Korean groups.
What if marginal change, the likes of which the KCNA-AP represents, is not a
harbinger of bigger, more signiﬁcant change? What if the smoke signals are insigniﬁ-
cant? The answer, though disdained by many liberals and optimists alike, is simple:
so be it. The point is to not let an uncomfortable history needlessly limit our capa-
bilities to look at every new case anew and be open to signs of actual change and
consider its positive consequences.
Our article and the arguments presented within are not intended to support the
“hope springs eternal” school of thought. In other words, we are not suggesting that
a relative increase in cultural diplomacy is clear evidence that structural reform is
afoot inside the DPRK.22 Additionally, as we made clear earlier in the article, efforts
at engaging the world through using cultural interaction as the medium of exchange
is not a unique trait of the new Kim Jong-un regime. We are not linking the send-
ing of the Unhasu Orchestra or the new relationship between the KCNA and the 
AP as signs that broader reform in the economic or political realm is just steps 
behind.
What we are arguing for, though, is for a reframing of the problem of the DPRK’s
institutional cultural interactions with the outside world, and for a study of those
interactions that has much greater empirical and theoretical detail; there is an in-
between space nestled somewhere between Sunshine Policy enthusiasts and distrust-
ful polemics. After all, as many North Korea watchers are still wont to argue, efforts
at a “charm offensive” out of Pyongyang is nothing but a show and cultural engage-
ment is not indicative of anything larger. Their conclusion is thus: cultural diplo-
macy is the DPRK’s effort to completely dupe the outside and we should thus ignore
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the signals sent and any relationships established. Except those advocating complete
containment and collapse, there is a consensus that engagement with North Korea
is needed, when appropriate, at all levels possible. What we have shown throughout
this article is that this is indeed happening now at the cultural level—or, in diplo-
matic-talk, at the level of track-two diplomacy. In analyzing engagement at the cul-
tural level we must, as Joseph Nye and other soft-power advocates suggest, operate
under the assumption that North Korea—like all countries—is not immune from
the laws of soft power, going both ways. North Korea has the capacity to both attract
and be attracted.
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